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 Posthumanist Panic Cinema 
Defining a Genre 
SCOTT LOREN 
 
Collective representations are the re-
sult of an immense co-operation, 
which stretches out not only into 
space but into time as well; to make 
them, a multitude of minds have as-
sociated, united and combined their 
ideas and sentiments.  
(EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMEN-
TARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE) 
 
 
Mainstream American cinema around the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury was prolific in producing a specific representation of the individ-
ual in crisis: a human subject beset by an onslaught of forces alien to 
itself. The regularity with which this type of figure appeared in popu-
lar cinema was both a result of and contributed to practices of collec-
tive representation. Implicit in the assumption that popular narratives 
provide insight into the cultures that produce and circulate them is the 
concomitant assumption that identities and subjectivities are insepara-
ble from stories cultures tell about themselves, and that upon closer 
examination, these stories will always tell something more about his-
torical selves. Following this logic, popular cinematic representations 
can be treated as cultural artefacts that both form collective represen-
tations and reflect “collective preoccupations,” as Renée Hoogland has 
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put it (213). Who, then, was this set-upon figure in popular cinema of 
recent decades, and what can his collective representation tell us about 
the ideas and sentiments Durkheim proposes as indicators of cultural 
concerns?1 
 
 
THE LIBERAL HUMANIST SUBJECT 
 
Charles Guignon begins his book On Being Authentic with reference 
to an event that was nothing short of a cultural happening in the Unit-
ed States: the reception of Phillip C. McGraw’s Self Matters: Creating 
Your Life from the Inside Out. McGraw’s 2001 self-help book struck a 
nerve with its American readership. On the New York Times bestseller 
list for 43 weeks, Guignon points out that Self Matters epitomized the 
style of “books, television talk show and magazine articles” in which 
the “idea of achieving an authentic existence” remained the topic of 
concern day in and day out in American media culture (1). It is no co-
incidence that McGraw came to prominence through his appearance 
on the Oprah Winfrey Show, which itself “has made authenticity a 
central theme for her six or seven million daily viewers” for nearly 
twenty-five years (ibid). McGraw’s focus on authenticity may not be a 
new addition to the self-help/therapy-culture discourse of the time, but 
he is particularly interesting for two reasons: his level of prominence 
in popular media and the accuracy with which his “authentic self” mir-
rors the characteristics of the liberal humanist subject. Guignon quotes 
McGraw as follows: 
 
The authentic self is the you that can be found at your absolute core. It is the 
part of you that is not defined by your job, or your function, or your role. It is 
the composite of all your unique gifts, skills, abilities, interests, talents, in-
sights, and wisdom. It is all your strengths and values that are uniquely yours 
and need expression, versus what you have been programmed to believe that 
you are “supposed to be and do.” (2, emphasis in the original) 
                                                             
1  I exclusively use the masculine pronoun here as the crisis of the liberal 
humanist subject appears to have been a predominantly masculine crisis in 
the period and medium indicated. 
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According to this account, each individual has an innate “core” that, 
we can infer, is the source of his or her personality, characteristics, 
abilities, etc. independent of social and cultural influence. The debate 
on freedom embedded in this description is one in which the core self 
is opposed to forms of social control. A confluence of the pressures of 
various institutions and personal experiences, it should further be in-
ferred, results in conditions that force one to think and act in ways an-
tithetical to the inclinations of the authentic self’s core. To realize 
one’s self fully, one needs to free oneself from such psycho-social re-
straints and thereby enable unrestrained access to one’s core, one’s au-
thentic self, to one’s true potential in its uncorrupted natural form. The 
self McGraw sketches out is thus a markedly essentialist self that 
might be positioned on the nature side of the somewhat dusty nature 
vs. culture debate. Even in McGraw’s very brief description above, 
one can identify traces of an extended history of essentialist-humanist 
thinking that has situated itself against external influence, from Rous-
seau’s noble savage, to the Cartesian cogito isolated from external in-
put and impulses, to the individual freedom and autonomy of the En-
lightenment subject (from Hobbes and Locke to Kant) that C.B. Mac-
pherson reformulates in terms of “possessive individualism” in his in-
fluential work The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. If 
book sales and viewer ratings are taken as indications of the popularity 
such a model might hold, then this particular account of the authentic 
self was undoubtedly resonant with a large segment of media-
consuming Americans at the time. My wager is that we can find fur-
ther support for such a claim in mainstream cinema of the same era. 
The figure of the essentialist, liberal humanist subject (‘LHS’ from 
here on), whose ‘core,’ identity, individuality or authenticity is under 
threat of compromise by external agents, is the most prominent figure 
in posthumanist panic cinema at the turn of the century, giving expres-
sion to a particular form of millennial dis-ease. 
Posthumanist panic cinema might be conceived of as cinema that 
stages some form of threat to the liberal humanist subject’s authentici-
ty. To reduce what is at stake here to a single phrase, one might claim 
that the authenticity of the LHS is grounded in its forms of essential-
ism. What makes the LHS authentic is the innate status ascribed to its 
characteristics and its potential as a free agent. Guignon categorizes 
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characteristics of liberal humanism and Enlightenment subjectivity 
more generally as indicators for authentic subjectivity in the modern 
era: “[T]he modern worldview understands humans as nuclear selves. 
To be human, on this view, is to be a self-contained, bounded individ-
ual, a center of experience and will, with no essential or defining rela-
tions to anything or anyone outside oneself” (108). According to this 
definition, what Guignon refers to as the authentic subject in modern 
philosophy and what, following N. Katherine Hayles, I am calling the 
liberal humanist subject might be positioned in contrast to what Bernd 
Stiegler recently referred to as a ‘best of’ subject theory in the hu-
manities: psychoanalysis (Freud, Lacan), discourse and power (Fou-
cault, Derrida), capital and empire (Marx; Hardt and Negri), ideology 
(Althusser), performativity and gender (Butler, Halberstam), post-
colonialism (Fanon, Bhabha, Said, Spivak), not to mention the con-
temporary currents in posthumanism seeking to push the subject off 
the map.2 This synoptic list of approaches to subject theory in the hu-
manities makes immediately clear that what have turned out to be the 
most prominent approaches of the last century are all opposed to es-
sentialist notions of the self.3 
The five characteristics Guignon enumerates as constitutive of the 
authentic subject are more or less interchangeable with the definitive 
elements of liberal humanism and are thus useful for clarifying pre-
cisely what comes under threat in posthumanist panic cinema: 
                                                             
2  Stiegler’s comment was in reference to a talk given by Jörg Metelmann 
and myself titled “Visualizing Subjectivity: A Dual Ontology,” at the Uni-
versity of St. Gallen, 2 May 2011. 
3  N. Katherine Hayles theorizes the decline of liberal subjectivity in relation 
to the onset of “cybernetic anxiety” in the 1950s in her chapter “Liberal 
Subjectivity Imperiled: Norbert Wiener and Cybernetic Anxiety” of How 
We Became Posthuman (84). Thinking of the LHS primarily defined 
through its essentialism, the threat against it has a far broader historical 
base in the humanities. In this context, it perhaps makes more sense to 
subsume cybernetics in a broader intellectual history over the last century 
that repeatedly took turns at dismantling the LHS. 
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1. the authentic subject is defined as an “inner space;” 
2. it is the “source from which action springs;” 
3. it has the capacity for self-reflection and self-consciousness; 
4. it is “self-subsistent, distinct from everything outside itself, in-
cluding its own body;” 
5. self-realization is the ultimate goal (Guignon 108-9) 
 
To briefly recapitulate these points through established (primarily En-
lightenment) notions of the self, the first reiterates the notion of an es-
sential core, and is thus concerned with the question of borders; the 
second reiterates Rousseau’s notion of the noble savage, and is thus 
concerned with a natural sense of character and agency; the third reit-
erates Descartes’s cogito; the forth, Descartes’s mind/body split and 
radical autonomy; and the fifth returns to the notion of an essentialist 
core, hidden under the constraints of society and the psyche and in 
need of freeing. One might thus also link the final point to Kant’s En-
lightenment injunction Sapere Aude!, where the courage to embrace 
self-knowledge will ultimately liberate the individual from self-
imposed immaturity and deliver him into self-realization.4 It is pre-
cisely the threat to borders of the self, to agency, to the authenticity of 
self-consciousness, to autonomy and to self-realization that is at stake 
in posthumanist panic cinema. 
 
 
POSTHUMANIST PANIC CINEMA 
 
What is posthumanist panic cinema? The term should indicate both 
cinema that depicts representations of the posthuman and threat to 
humanist philosophies and ideologies. Though the terms posthuman 
and posthumanism are rather close and have at times been conflated 
by some theorists, one would be hard pressed to legitimate the claim 
that posthuman cinema is more representative of posthumanist philos-
ophies than it is of humanist ones, wherein lies the point: posthuman 
cinema generally depicts various forms of panic expressive of anxiety 
                                                             
4  Immanuel Kant’s famous response to the question “What is Enlighten-
ment?” in the Berlinische Monatschrift, November, 1784. 
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regarding the status of the LHS. Posthuman cinema has often taken a 
reactionary stance in opposition to philosophies of posthumanism. If, 
following popular usage, posthuman cinema consists primarily in sto-
ries of artificial intelligence, virtual realities, alien abduction or visita-
tion and cyborgian science fiction, then the filmic narratives of 
posthuman cinema tend to position themselves anxiously in relation to 
logics of posthumanism and nostalgically, even desperately, in rela-
tion to tenets of humanism. Posthuman popular cinema, one might 
say, is in a state of crisis. That is not to say it is in immediate danger 
of becoming financially unviable. To the contrary: though its concerns 
might be shifting, posthuman cinema continues to reverberate through 
multiplexes, across the screens of portable devices and along the cor-
ridors of collective imaginaries. With its capacity for metamorphosis 
and for mirroring desire and anxiety on the border between the known 
and the yet-to-be known, posthuman cinema is alive, but not well – at 
least not from a posthumanist perspective. If posthumanist theory at-
tempts to map the philosophical territory that succeeds humanist 
thought, posthuman cinema has been astute to the turbulence accom-
panying such a shift. 
Inquiring into “what remains of humanism in the posthumanist 
landscape” (15), Neil Badmington has suggested that, from a Derridi-
an or Lyotardian position on the uses of the prefix post-, “posthuman-
ism does not (and, moreover, cannot) mark or make an absolute break 
from the legacy of humanism […]. Humanism has happened and con-
tinues to happen to ‘us’ (it is the very ‘Thing’ that makes ‘us’ ‘us,’ in 
fact)” (21-22). Though recent shifts in posthumanist theory appear to 
be making headway on this front – challenging notions of ‘us,’ for ex-
ample, by focusing elsewhere (not on human beings as individuals or 
subjects, or not on topics like consciousness and agency), through 
processes of re-contextualization and re-categorization (as in second 
order systems theory), or by expanding the category of ‘us’ to be more 
broadly inclusive (as in animal studies) – much of posthuman cinema 
has been concerned with the remains of the human in posthuman bio-
tic and non-biotic communities, and what can be salvaged of human-
ism in an age where prosthetic coupling and recursive interactivity, 
what Cary Wolfe calls “the prosthetic coevolution of the human ani-
mal with the technicity of tools and external archival mechanisms 
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(such as language and culture),” becomes “increasingly impossible to 
ignore” (Wolfe xv). 
Of course, with fictional narratives to be read, heard and viewed, 
there is also the function of identification to consider. If one is to gain 
access to a story, then it is through some form of focalization. From 
the various possible perspectives we take when we read or watch 
films, as humans we access narratives and identify within them pri-
marily – though with exception – via characters that either are or high-
ly resemble humans.5 Be that as it may, it would also be amiss to 
claim that posthuman cinema does not move into the territory of prop-
er posthumanist, non-anthropocentric representation and philosophical 
discourse because, from a narratological perspective, it cannot. Con-
sidering the ways in which popular cinema reflects and reflexively 
contributes to collective preoccupations, one might postulate that 
posthuman cinema is for the most part not interested in decentring the 
human, nor in doing away with humanism. The dominant story has ra-
ther been one of anxiety regarding forms of decentrement. 
Rather than presenting a viable posthumanist philosophy, posthu-
man cinema predominantly stages posthumanist anxiety about the loss 
of or threat to defining characteristics of the LHS even when the 
viewer is prompted to identify with the figure of the biological 
posthuman, as in the filmic adaptations of Phillip K. Dick’s post-
utopian, paranoid science fiction. N. Katherine Hayles has proposed 
that the decline of the LHS is inaugurated by Norbert Wiener’s theory 
of cybernetics presented at the Macy conferences in the mid-1940s: 
“By the mid-twentieth century, liberal humanism, self-regulating ma-
chinery, and positive individualism had come together in an uneasy al-
liance that at once helped to create the cyborg and also undermine the 
foundations of liberal subjectivity” (86). She also notes that the work 
of Phillip K. Dick in the 1960s was particularly attuned to the poten-
tial threat self-regulating machines posed to liberal humanism. Dick’s 
depictions of the cyborg begged the question, “should a cybernetic 
machine, sufficiently powerful in its self-regulating processes to be-
come fully conscious and rational, be allowed to own itself?” (ibid). 
Dick’s fiction thus foregrounded a sudden instability the cyborg en-
                                                             
5  For an analysis of posthumanist focalization, see Clarke. 
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gendered for assumptions about authenticity, autonomy and agency, 
and by extension what it meant to be human. With the unprecedented 
influence Dick has had on an era of film-making, Hayles’s remark 
could not be more pertinent to the anxieties reflected in posthumanist 
panic cinema.  
The notion of the posthuman in posthumanist panic cinema em-
ployed here – portraying what comes after or is beyond the biological 
human at a specific historical moment – is aligned with the popular 
notion outlined above: artificial intelligence, virtual realities, alien ab-
duction or visitation and cyborgian science fiction. Added to the scope 
of this rather conventional category of the posthuman is a considera-
tion of conspiracy films. Where posthuman cinema reflects types of 
posthumanist anxiety about body and identity borders and differentia-
tion through representations of the posthuman form, conspiracy films 
tend to articulate similar types of panic in relation to autonomy, agen-
cy and control. Although conspiracy films need not present the figure 
of the biological posthuman, they are likewise always concerned with 
borders, differentiation and alterity. It is thus not surprising that con-
spiracy narratives are inevitably tied into the stories and plots of more 
conventional posthuman, that is cyborgian and extra-terrestrial, cine-
ma. 
The elements of threat in posthumanist panic cinema can be cate-
gorized according to three interrelated but distinct crises represented 
in the three interrelated but distinct sub-genres: cyborgia and the crisis 
of authenticity, conspiracy and the crisis of agency/autonomy, extra-
terrestrials and the crisis of metaphysical determinism. Each of these 
panic cinema sub-genres are characterized by a central threat that, 
with great consistency, organizes character actions and drives the plot. 
In cyborg or artificial intelligence films, the threat is one of no longer 
being able to distinguish between the authentic and the inauthentic in 
terms of physical and biological processes, but also in terms of identi-
ty formation, cognition and emotional capacities. Conspiracy films are 
characterized by a compromise of free will and the ability to effect 
meaningful action. Finally, extra-terrestrial films are characterized by 
a more general threat to human autonomy, where non-human agencies 
can potentially determine the fate of human subjects, though as I will 
show, the threat in extra-terrestrial cinema can simultaneously repre-
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sent both anxiety about and desire for metaphysically deterministic 
agencies. 
With the proliferation of ‘real life’ alien abduction testimonials 
around the turn of the century, and with continuing mutual paranoia 
from both the politically conservative and liberal communities about 
the other controlling the media in order to manipulate popular opinion, 
extra-terrestrials and conspiracy have become commonplace topics in 
America that receive earnest attention even in non-fictional popular 
media: think, for example, of conspiracy theories surrounding the 9/11 
attacks that placed blame on the conservative ‘powers that be,’ or 
Glenn Beck’s more recent prime-time explanations of the vicissitudes 
of power on the left. Equally, real cyborgia has become a second na-
ture, so to speak: there is uninterrupted connectivity to apparatuses for 
communication and information retrieval, as well as inextricable binds 
to machines, gadgets, medicines and other prostheses that accompany 
humans through their daily lives, and a broad recognition throughout 
the humanities of language as a kind of proto-prosthesis to the human. 
Moreover, digital social network technologies have quite literally 
transported communicable identity formation and potential subjectivi-
ty into the realm of the virtual. Taking all of this into consideration, I 
would wager that the enormous commercial success posthumanist 
panic cinema has enjoyed can hardly be reduced to the appeal of es-
cape into sci-fi fantasy worlds. It has much more to do with the ability 
for popular cinema to both reflect and shape the concerns of viewing 
audiences beyond the world of cinematic fiction. 
The popularity of extra-terrestrial, conspiracy and cyborg narra-
tives in and beyond fiction is perhaps not cause enough to consider 
them together as constitutive of a shared phenomenon in popular cul-
ture. The level of genre-hybridity between posthuman and conspiracy 
narratives, though, points toward the shared humanist sensibilities that 
have constituted the particular form of millennial dis-ease in relation 
to the LHS addressed above. Uniting these sub-genres beyond their 
sensibilities about subjectivity and the liberal humanist characteristics 
of authenticity, agency, autonomy and the desire for stable metaphysi-
cal truths, are their shared thematic content depicting fear of new 
technologies and of the foreign, concern about political ideologies and 
social cohesion, and modes of expressing and experiencing the spir-
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itual or quasi-religious within a secular context. Whatever various el-
ements these sub-genres share or intermingle, their respective narra-
tives almost always revolve around a central allegorical commentary 
on authentic subjectivity and are expressive of some form of posthu-
manist anxiety, thus indicating an overarching theme of authentic sub-
jectivity in crisis structuring or giving impetus to the allegories. The 
following will be a brief, though I hope nevertheless enlightening con-
sideration of LHS crises divided among the posthumanist panic cine-
ma sub-genres. 
 
 
CYBORGIA AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
Cyborg and artificial intelligence films interrogate the implications of 
the artificial being for the authentic human. But what kind of authen-
ticity are we talking about? With the decoding of DNA and with the 
ability to clone complex biological organisms, authenticity can hardly 
still have anything to do with the natural processes of conception and 
generation or with biological and non-biological difference. Descartes 
already theorized this shift with the mechanical monkey of his Media-
tions on First Philosophy. Authenticity will have to be sought else-
where. As I have illustrated in an earlier article drawing on the theo-
retical framework of Louis Althusser’s notion of “interpellation,” 
films such as Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, Ridley 
Scott’s Blade Runner, Steven Spielberg’s A.I. and filmic versions of 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein all stage processes of identity and sub-
ject formation as a central component in obfuscating the boundaries 
between human authenticity and cyborgian artificiality.6 
In his ‘notes’ on ideology, socio-ideological structures and subjec-
tivity, moving from a necessary though complicated distinction be-
tween concrete individuals and concrete subjects, Louis Althusser de-
fines interpellation as a hailing of the individual into subjectivity. Ide-
ological (state) apparatus such as schools, family, religion, political af-
filiation and profession repeatedly hail the individual, at once forming 
the individual’s social status as a subject along with their private iden-
                                                             
6  See Loren. 
Bereitgestellt von | transcript Verlag
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 04.04.17 13:03
POSTHUMANIST PANIC CINEMA | 169 
tity. They position the individual within the ideological and symbolic 
matrix of relations to other subjects and institutions. The hailed indi-
vidual acknowledges that he or she – or it in the age of posthumanism 
– is the proper subject of the call by recognizing the call and respond-
ing to it accordingly. Thus, a perpetual reestablishing and reaffirma-
tion of positions within the social-symbolic takes place, through which 
not only is the hailed subject located, but, by being located in relation 
to all the subtle and not so subtle conditions of the life surrounding, 
interpellation functions in an omni-directional manner, situating and 
re-situating all subjects and subjectivities. 
If the cyborg or automaton of cyborgian cinema does not pose an 
outright physical threat to humans, as in the case of the first Termina-
tor film (James Cameron, 1984), then the threat it consistently poses is 
one in which its identity formation processes mirror that of the human. 
In each of the films noted above, effective processes of interpellation 
make the distinction between human identity-subjectivity and non-
human identity-subjectivity increasingly meaningless. Think, for ex-
ample, of the mental images (memories and dreams) and physical pic-
tures the Replicants of Blade Runner carry around with them as evi-
dence of their humanity and authenticity, or of the literal staging of the 
interpellative process in A.I. (the “Imprinting Protocol” scene), where 
the naming of characters in relation to one another literally hardwires 
the cyber-boy with love for his orga-mother (and much to the moth-
er’s surprise this also functions vice versa). 
There are of course other means of obfuscating the distinction be-
tween authenticity and artificiality in these films. From the super-
computer Hal’s survival instincts in 2001, to the possession of a soul 
and eye as the window to the soul in Blade Runner, to the Oedipal love 
of one’s mother in A.I., to the desire for paternal and conjugal compan-
ionship in Frankenstein, the cyborg becomes an increasingly emotional, 
creative, moral, critical and humane figure. An additionally consistent 
pattern in cyborg cinema, though, is that despite the authenticity of its 
human characteristics, whether these are of appearance or quality of 
character, the artificial being must inevitably perish at the hands of its 
creator. The problem it poses, of course, is one of authenticity. With the 
image and the character of the artificial being raised to the level of au-
thenticity – that is, in addition to its physical human form, the artificial 
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being is in possession of all of the defining characteristics of the LHS – 
the authentic human itself becomes, to borrow Benjamin’s phrase, “the 
blue flower in the land of technology,” an imaginary projection of a lost 
ideal that technology has penetrated to the heart of (Benjamin 458; my 
translation).7 To extend the reference to Benjamin a bit further, one 
might claim that if the cyborg makes the authenticity of the LHS prob-
lematic, then at stake is the aura of authenticity, a distinctive individuali-
ty that has been raised to a deific status in liberal humanism, and now 
threatens to crumble, or already has. 
In cyborgia, the human is positioned vis-à-vis the posthuman arti-
ficial being, exhibiting difficulties in determining alterity and, moreo-
ver, in determining what these very difficulties represent. These films 
begin their commentary on alterity by making the physical appearance 
of the artificial being either radically different from or radically simi-
lar to the human. Their collective aim, however, is to frame the sub-
ject-forming processes as identical for both the artificial being and the 
human. By depicting subject- and identity-forming processes for the 
artificial being as indistinguishable from the human being, these narra-
tives provide a kind of meta-commentary on authenticity with regard 
to subjectivity and identity. They iterate the notion that subjectivity, 
and through it identity, is a construct negotiated beyond the individu-
al’s own reflexive notions of the self; or, beyond the jurisdiction of 
liberal humanist essentialism. What viewers thus witness in cyborg 
cinema is an extension of the nature versus culture debate, in which if 
we assume that culture has prevailed, the borders to the authentic hu-
man disintegrate. The threat to the borders of human authenticity pre-
sented in cyborg cinema in turn also raise symptomatic questions in 
response to the fear of subjectivity as a social construct: if my identity 
is not something that springs forth naturally from myself, then who is 
responsible for its coming into being? And to what extent do these 
‘external agents’ have control over me? This questioning logic pro-
vides the best link to the paranoid structures of perception that provide 
the fundamental energies and logics driving the plots of conspiracy 
narratives. 
                                                             
7  Original: “[…] der Anblick der unmittelbaren Wirklichkeit zu der blauen 
Blume im Lande der Technik.” 
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CONSPIRACY 
 
Where narratives on automatons and artificial beings give expression 
to crises in relation to the authenticity of identity, conspiracy narra-
tives have a reactionary quality in which anxiety about a loss of agen-
cy and autonomy manifests itself in the notion that an external agent 
has taken over command of the authentic self. Conspiracy situates 
subjects in relation to an Other agent that imposes its will on the indi-
vidual, and whose will the individual feels compelled to reject. Con-
sidering this structure in the manner I have done with cyborgia – as 
potentially reflective of a widespread cultural discomfort with the shift 
from Enlightenment and humanist notions of the authentic, essentialist 
self (nature) to constructivist notions of the authentic self (culture) in 
popular culture – it is a logical turn to associate anxiety about a loss of 
agency and autonomy with constructivist notions of the self. One also 
finds that although the focus is slightly different, being on autonomy 
and agency as definitive of authenticity as opposed to biology and 
identity/subjectivity forming processes as indicators for authenticity, 
the problem is still rooted in anxiety about the LHS essentialist core.  
As with the crisis of authenticity structuring cyborg cinema, we 
can see how an essentialist crisis might be symptomatic of dominant 
notions of selfhood circulating in late modernity: the subject as a pro-
duction of economic and political forces; the psyche, the ‘real core’ of 
the individual, is in a state of perpetual antagonism and beyond the in-
dividual’s control; the subject as occupying a position at the intersec-
tion of various ideologies and social forces. Some kind of false syn-
thesis of these notions reached an apex in popular culture through dis-
courses on and of postmodernism between the 1970s and 1990s. De-
spite the various problematic receptions of subject theories, particular-
ly where subject formation is completely free-floating and able to be 
formed and transformed at will, postmodernism convincingly popular-
ized notions of the subject as something fluid and always already de-
centred. Such perspectives destabilized traditional notions of borders 
to the self, and newfound fluidity led to completely new “technologies 
of the self,” to borrow Foucault’s phrase. 
As a symptom-figure of these social and cultural developments, one 
might argue, the conspired against individual fears the loss of its ability 
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to protect its own borders and control its own actions. Perhaps even 
more than in cyborg cinema, conspiracy necessarily presupposes an es-
sentialist self. It comes as no surprise that we find some form of inva-
sive surgery or penetration to the head as a repeated motif in conspiracy 
cinema. Such images reiterate the notion that the core of the authentic 
self is to be found in the mind, in the cogito (see Guignon’s fourth point 
above). In Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998), for example, the classical 
conspiracy trope of brainwashing is replaced by an injection directly in-
to the brain, manipulating one’s memory and one’s sense of self, ena-
bling the individual to be completely manipulated in every detail of life 
without being aware of any change whatsoever. The individual becomes 
an unsuspecting puppet. Jonathan Demme’s remake of The Manchurian 
Candidate (2004) also marks this more radical invasiveness to the cogi-
to as the authentic core of the self by visually intensifying the compro-
mise of its borders. Where John Frankenheimer’s original (1962) fa-
mously stages manipulation through brainwash, Demme stages an elab-
orate surgical procedure in which penetration to the ‘core’ is doubled on 
screen. We see Sgt. Raymond Shaw (Liev Schreiber) in an operation 
room having a hole drilled through his skull and into his brain. On a 
screen behind the operation table, we see a blown-up computer tomog-
raphy image of what is happening in Sgt. Shaw’s head: a drill penetrates 
his skull and a minute device for controlling him is inserted deep into 
his brain. The shift in imagery between the 1962 version and the 2004 
version is representative of the shift from cold-war anxiety about an un-
seen enemy who might compromise national borders and attempt to take 
control from without or through infiltration, to postmodern anxiety 
about the compromise of borders and loss of control at a far more inti-
mate level, penetrating deep into the core of the authentic self. 
If conspiracy is viewed as symptomatic of a nostalgic longing for a 
return to the autonomy of the liberal humanist subject with a protected 
inner core, one might interpret the anxiety reflected in conspiracy as a 
response to the poststructuralist and psychoanalytical deconstruction 
and rescinding of an internal/external dialectic. As the images of cogi-
to/brain penetration suggest, conspiracy narratives cling to an inter-
nal/external opposition. According to these terms, conspiratorial anxi-
ety is directed at a lack of unified centring (a non-object that divides 
the subject). Victoria Nelson has suggested that 
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From Plato to Descartes, the image of the puppetmaster pulling the strings to 
make his creation move had emblematized first a presumed division between 
soul and body, then one between mind and body. Recognizing the close con-
nection of the puppet and the robot with notions of intrapersonal invasion, ma-
nipulation, and loss of autonomy, the new twentieth-century discipline of psy-
chology identified the sensation that an alien entity is manipulating the afflict-
ed person, ‘pulling the strings,’ as a symptom of various types of pathology, 
particularly schizophrenia. (252) 
 
If we view conspiracy through the lens of a lack of centring that an-
tagonistically amplifies psychic tensions regarding identity, agency 
and autonomy, coupled with the lens of schizophrenia, we inevitably 
land in the proximity of Deleuzian ontological heterogeneity. Not sur-
prisingly, various cultural theorists working on conspiracy, from Mark 
Fenster and Patrick O’Donnell, to Jodi Dean and Peter Knight, partial-
ly ascribe the widespread prominence of conspiracy theories in Amer-
ican popular culture to the social and psychological effects of the 
logics of late capitalism. 
In Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar 
America, Timothy Melley describes conspiracy theories as reactionary 
narratives that hinge on a condition in which the individual experiences 
“intense anxiety about an apparent loss of autonomy or self-control – 
the conviction that one’s actions are being controlled by someone else, 
that one has been ‘constructed’ by powerful external agents” (12). Thus 
characterized, the individual is at a loss to effect meaningful, authentic 
action. Alessandro Ferrara has suggested that “[a]uthentic conduct has 
the quality of being somehow connected with, and expressive of, the 
core of the actor’s personality” (5). Calling for a reconsideration of au-
thenticity beyond the “internalist” and “externalist” accounts, Monika 
Betzler similarly states that it is a common though problematic intuition 
that “a person is self-governed only if she acts for reasons grounded in 
her authentic self” (51). In addition to these explanations, which take the 
position of potential compromise and loss of control, it is also necessary 
to position the subject of conspiracy as an individual who can no longer 
be held accountable for his or her own actions. Melley suggests that the 
popularity of conspiracy narratives stems from a “sense of diminished 
human agency, a feeling that individuals cannot effect meaningful social 
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action and, in extreme cases, may not be able to control their own be-
havior” (11). We might think of such conditions in conjunction with 
what Slovoj Žižek terms the logic of victimization: “[I]s the basic char-
acteristic of today’s ‘postmodern’ subject not the exact opposite of the 
free subject who experienced himself as ultimately responsible for his 
fate, namely the subject who grounds the authority of his speech on his 
status of a victim of circumstances beyond his control?” (124). Where 
the concept of autonomy loses currency within a cultural economy of 
ideologies, it becomes increasingly possible to place the blame for one’s 
actions elsewhere. 
We find tropes for this condition throughout conspiracy and other 
posthumanist panic cinemas. Take, for a rather explicit example, the 
narrator of Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club, adapted to the screen in 
1999 by David Fincher. He ascribes his own transgressive desire and 
behaviour to another person entirely, only to find out in the end that he 
is this other person, that through a trick of the mind he was able to 
both live out and keep himself at a distance from his transgressive de-
sire and behaviour. Although the practical trope for usurped control 
differs between Demme’s Manchurian Candidate and Fincher’s Fight 
Club, we again witness manipulation taking place at the most intimate 
location of the authentic self, the cogito. Fight Club is the best exam-
ple of staging schizophrenia as a conspiracy against oneself. It also 
poignantly stages this condition as a direct result of late capitalist con-
sumer lifestyle, and on these terms constructs a very similar philoso-
phy to Terry Gilliam’s Brazil (1985). 
Conspiracy cinema at the turn of the century displayed a wide 
range of modes of control. At the far end of the scale of manipulation, 
there are characters that have been programmed, such as everyone 
connected to the Matrix from the Wachowski brothers’ film of the 
same title. Again, here we find the trope of cogito penetration repre-
sented by the ‘cranial jack.’ We also find wholly manufactured indi-
viduals, as in Michael Bay’s The Island, where cloned individuals are 
manufactured as capital, waiting to be used as a biological resource. In 
such cases, the individual has been programmed or manipulated to 
such a degree that it might be considered a pure ‘product.’ Indeed, the 
abundance of product placement in Bay’s film takes on new signifi-
cance when viewed from this perspective. 
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To provide an additional turn in conspiracy cinema and its anxie-
ties about authenticity, conspiracy can also be understood in terms of 
anxiety about a lack of deterministic metaphysical meaning. Paranoia 
about an omnipotent and omniscient Other can inversely reflect a de-
sire for such an Other, an entity constitutive of one’s subjectivity and 
selfhood, providing being with a deeper meaning. That is, conspiracy 
can be understood not only in terms of fear of an overbearing Other 
that might compromise the borders to my authentic self, but also as 
symptomatic of the fear that there is no higher source that might sub-
stantiate one’s existence by lending it a greater purpose, through a 
deeper metaphysical authenticity. 
Fear of an omnipotent oppressive Other also inversely representative 
of the desire for an Other is very much how posthumanist panic cinema 
around the millennial turn was interpreting Descartes’s Meditations. 
This double-edged sword – a desire for an omniscient, omnipotent Other 
mixed with fear of an omniscient, omnipotent Other – is well represent-
ed in the ghost of Descartes’s evil genius that prominently appears with 
Blade Runner and continues to haunt posthumanist panic cinema. It 
seems that it is no longer possible to read the Meditations on First Phi-
losophy without raising the question that, if it is possible that nothing 
exists outside my mind, that through a deception of the senses I have 
simply dreamt everything up, then why is it not possible that I am simp-
ly a projection, a fantasy, in someone else’s dream – Descartes’s malev-
olent demon? This is the philosophical query structuring the plots and 
narratives of films such as Blade Runner, The Thirteenth Floor, eX-
istenZ, A.I., Minority Report, Vanilla Sky and The Matrix Trilogy, all 
notably staging a mix of cyborgia and conspiracy. The conflation of fear 
and desire of and for an omniscient and omnipotent Other, though, finds 
its literal apotheosis in the third incarnation of posthumanist panic pro-
jected onto the screen: extra-terrestrial cinema. 
 
 
EXTRA-TERRESTRIALS 
 
Jodi Dean suggests that, like the conspiratorial Other, “the alien takes 
away our agency, and the sense of security and certainty upon which 
our agency was predicated” (174). The alien is in possession of 
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knowledge and power beyond human capacities and can attack, ab-
duct, infiltrate or exterminate at will. Abstracting the defining charac-
teristics of the extra-terrestrial into familiar terms, the alien, like the 
conspiratorial Other, is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. As 
such, the alien and the conspiratorial Other both present a threat to the 
human that engenders metaphysical fear. Think, for example, of the 
various extra-terrestrial narratives that are apocalyptic in nature, from 
H.G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds (1898) to M. Night Shyamalan’s 
Signs (2002). Of course, the alien in cinema not only represents a 
wrathful sky-god. It is also the embodiment of a strong desire for non-
secular identity anchors; the alien can alternately represent a wrathful 
god and a benevolent one. 
Extra-terrestrial cinema emphasizes the desire for metaphysical 
determinism in posthumanist panic cinema by giving the stories and 
imagery a more mystical, quasi-religious character. Caron Schwarz 
Ellis suggests that the appearance of aliens in popular cinema address-
es both “our deepest fears about technology and […] spiritual ques-
tions about our destiny” (83). Although this point is brought to the 
fore in extra-terrestrial cinema, the mystical and quasi-religious are al-
so evident to varying degrees in cyborgia and conspiracy: think of the 
god-creator theme in Frankenstein and Blade Runner, or Neo as sav-
iour in The Matrix and Dan Brown’s enormously successful Christian 
mystery conspiracy fictions and their filmic adaptations. Desire for 
metaphysically deterministic, quasi-mystical meaning is an additional 
element uniting cyborgia, conspiracy and extra-terrestrial cinema, 
constituting an additional posthumanist crisis. With the addition of 
this particular form of crisis, posthumanist panic cinema is capable of 
staging anxiety about the compromised LHS’s authenticity, autonomy 
and agency, but also anxiety about the loss of what was transformed in 
the secularization of the authentic self: spiritual subjectivity. Although 
the LHS is generally thought of in relation to secular humanism, it has 
often been argued that the humanist displacement of deities or God of-
fers no significant departure from the Judeo-Christian structures of 
theism; that the human itself is simply raised to the status of divinity, 
thus constituting a mere shift from theism to deism. As Foucault 
pointed out in “What is Enlightenment,” “[S]ince the seventeenth cen-
tury, what has been called humanism has always been obliged to lean 
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on certain conceptions of man borrowed from religion, science or poli-
tics” (44). The nostalgia, or something more urgent, for non-secular 
subjectivity anchors is not in conflict with the LHS tenets of agency 
and autonomy, but rather accompanies them in a hidden form. 
Posthumanist panic cinema is thus characterized by a confluence 
of technological fear and fetish coupled with a loss of agency, prob-
lems of autonomy and desire for metaphysically deterministic mean-
ing. Not surprisingly, philosophizing on this unseemly knot of desire 
and anxiety regarding the physical and the metaphysical is not limited 
to popular American cinema. In The Ethics of Authenticity, Charles 
Taylor proposes three “malaises of modernity”: 
 
1. Regarding individualism: “[W]orry has been repeatedly ex-
pressed that the individual lost something important along with 
the larger social and cosmic horizons of action” (3). “Instead of a 
higher purpose that opens the space for heroic action, there is on-
ly “abnormal and regrettable self-absorption” (4).  
2. Regarding “instrumental reason”: “[T]he primacy of instrumental 
reason is also evident in the prestige and aura that surrounds 
technology, and makes us believe that we should seek technolog-
ical solutions even when something very different is called for” 
(6). 
3. Regarding the loss of political vigour: a combined result of points 
1 and 2, in which “the institutions and structures of industrial-
technological society severely restrict our choices,” forcing “so-
cieties as well as individuals to give a weight to instrumental rea-
son that in serious moral deliberation we would never do” (8).  
 
Taylor’s third malaise recalls Nietzsche’s last man in that “few will 
want to participate actively in self-government” but would “prefer to 
stay at home and enjoy the satisfactions of private life” (Taylor 9). As 
long as the government provides for the conditions that allow for non-
political personal pleasures, the individual is satisfied to increasingly 
withdraw from a politicized social sphere. Taylor suggests that such a 
condition leads to what Tocqueville called “soft despotism,” where the 
“vast bureaucratic state” contributes to a feeling of helplessness and 
powerlessness (think again of Brazil and Fight Club) (Taylor 10). 
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Drawing a parallel between these notions and posthumanist panic cin-
ema, it seems to me that one might unproblematically link Taylor’s 
third malaise, along with Nietzsche’s last man and Tocqueville’s soft 
despotism, to Timothy Melley’s concept of “agency panic,” which 
characterizes conspiracy culture in America: the fear of powerful ex-
ternal forces of economy and the state coupled with the feeling of an 
inability to effect meaningful action (Melley 12). 
In Taylor’s model, feelings of helplessness and powerlessness cir-
cularly relate back to the relinquishing of agency and inability to 
ground authentic action in deeper social or metaphysical formations of 
meaning. In these terms, it appears that posthumanist panic cinema 
philosophizes about the compromises to the LHS in much the same 
way Taylor and the tradition he draws on does, with a focus on au-
thenticity, autonomy and metaphysical meaning; or as Taylor puts it, 
“the loss of meaning” and “fading moral horizons,” “the eclipse of the 
ends,” and the “loss of freedom” (10). Though where Taylor’s analy-
sis is descriptive and prescriptive, posthumanist panic cinema as a cul-
tural artifact is symptomatic. 
An extract from Sigmund Freud’s Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego is helpful in addressing the mystico-religious turn 
extra-terrestrial cinema puts on the paranoid structure of suspicion 
about an omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent Other in posthu-
manist panic cinema. He proposes that religion and religious narra-
tives in pre-secular societies protected the individual from various 
neuroses and helped to prevent an indulgence in a pathological adher-
ence to imaginary (in the Lacanian sense) structures. He also address-
es the types of neuroses that can develop once religious institutions 
and narratives lose their potency: 
 
Even those who do not regret the disappearance of religious illusions from the 
civilized world of today will admit that so long as they were in force they of-
fered those who were bound by them the most powerful protection against the 
danger of neurosis. Nor is it hard to discern that all the ties that bind people to 
mystico-religious or philosophico-religious sects and communities are expres-
sion of crooked cures of all kinds of neuroses [...]. If he is left to himself, a 
neurotic is obliged to replace by his own symptom formations the great group 
formations from which he is excluded. He creates his own world of imagina-
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tion for himself, his own religion, his own system of delusions, and thus reca-
pitulates the institutions of humanity in a distorted way [...]. (Freud 74) 
 
Freud’s hypothesis is a useful supplement to the obviousness with 
which extra-terrestrial narratives employ spiritual or religious motifs 
to stage anxieties concerning both the individual’s potential metaphys-
ical determination and its being-in-the-world. By extension, Freud’s 
claim can also shed light on the posthumanist anxiety reflected in 
posthumanist panic cinema more generally, with cyborg, conspiracy 
and extra-terrestrial cinema staging and reflecting on psychic tensions 
and pathological perceptions of the self in relation to anxieties about 
authentic modes of subjectivity. However implicit or explicit, at stake 
in such narratives is always the individual’s perception of itself in re-
lation to society and anxieties about the social forces that determine 
selfhood and subjectivity. In this regard, cyborg, conspiracy and extra-
terrestrial cinema can be thought of in terms of a popularized reaction-
ary response to social constructivism, which does not offer anchors for 
authentic selfhood in non-secular metaphysical forms, nor in the En-
lightenment mode of autonomy, nor in the humanist mode of authen-
ticity and agency; and it is in this sense that the respective anxieties 
they stage should be understood as symptomatic of posthumanist anx-
ieties. 
 
 
HUMANISM AND POSTHUMANISM 
 
As Neil Badmington has suggested, discourse on posthumanism au-
tomatically assumes two approximate poles of historical and philo-
sophical perceptions of the human subject: the humanist and the 
posthumanist. The advent of the secular humanist position is usually 
contextualized in relation to the triad of the Cartesian subject, Renais-
sance Humanism and post-Enlightenment secular Humanism. To 
whatever extent these three categorizations for positioning a notion of 
the human differ, they all share a principle of essentialism, where met-
aphysical truth claims about human authenticity and potential agency 
are the focus of discourse and serve to affirm notions of an authentic 
self. Although the Cartesian and Enlightenment self may conceivably 
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be influenced from the outside, the humanist subject does not find any 
source for its being in anything external to itself. It is rather a natural 
self that springs forth independent of the individual’s experience in the 
world and whose borders of the self constitute a distinction between 
the individual’s autonomy and agency, and the world that the individ-
ual moves within. It is precisely this tradition of essentialism that 
posthumanist theory is opposed to, and that posthumanist panic cine-
ma stages a fearful loss of. 
In its counter-position to the humanist principle of essentialism, 
the human subject as autonomous agent, and against the human sub-
ject as the organizing principle and focus of knowledge and discourse, 
posthumanism functions on a principle of decentrement. On the one 
hand, this is a result of technology. On the other hand, current 
posthumanist theory of decentrement is anchored in anti-humanist and 
post-structuralist philosophies, such as the theoretical anti-humanism 
Althusser proposes in his defense of Marx against theoretical anthro-
pology, and Foucault’s archaeological deconstruction of “man,” as “an 
invention of recent date” (Foucault, Order 387). Both Althusser and 
Foucault decentre the human by putting universal humanist truth-
claims fundamentally into doubt and contextualizing the human as 
historically constructed through ideological discourses. In the same 
years (from 1964 to 1966), Derrida achieves this destabilization of 
universal truth claims or the “transcendental signified” by arguing that 
the centre (of historical thought, knowledge, language) “was not a 
fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite 
number of sign-substitutions came into play” (Derrida 353-54). For 
posthumanist theory, the anti-humanist tradition provides a crucial 
turn by destabilizing universal truth claims about the human, and de-
stabilizing the so-called centre of subject-centred discourse: Althusser 
moves agency from the human to a structural formula of social rela-
tions, Foucault to the episteme of a particular historic era, and Derrida 
to language – each constituting a theory of radical contingency that, as 
Lacanian subject theory did, divides the subject, turning the individual 
into what one might term a ‘dividual.’ 
Where philosophies of posthumanism are, with some exceptions, 
logical extensions of theory in the humanities that divide, decentre, 
deconstruct and displace the LHS, posthumanist panic cinema can be 
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seen as presenting a kind of reactionary skepticism regarding subject 
formation as it is articulated from various logics of social constructiv-
ist theories. What troubles the subject of posthumanist panic cinema 
can to a large extent be attributed to the idea that identity and, much 
less so, subjectivity are not something that simply spring forth from 
the individual, but are perpetually negotiated and renegotiated from 
the start, and that this negotiation does not consist of a struggle to dis-
cover one’s authentic self and realize one’s natural potential, but ra-
ther of the struggle for proper positioning in social systems (including 
language). 
Though for quite some time it has been neither radical nor particu-
larly original for theory to claim that the subject is unthinkable beyond 
the context of the social, perhaps this is not what is at stake in popular 
cinema’s portrayals of destabilizing essentialism in the last thirty or 
forty years. Posthumanist panic cinema might rather be thought of as 
addressing itself to the viewer-subject’s latent knowledge of its own 
decentrement. As such, we might think of posthumanist panic cinema 
in terms of symptom-formation – “the result of a specific process, of a 
psychical working out” – of collective preoccupations about authentic-
ity, agency, individualism, technology, subjectivity, social formations, 
locations of power, etc (Laplanche/Pontalis 446). As W.J.T. Mitchell 
has put it, “[S]till another task [of art] is the re-articulation of what we 
mean by the human, by humanism, and the humanities” (498). 
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